










































































































































































From Uyghurs to Kashgaris (and 
back?) 
Migration and cross-border interactions  









China and Pakistan share a common border, formally established in 1963, and a 
close friendship which, to a certain extent, is a direct consequence of that agree-
ment. Somewhat surprisingly the two countries managed to maintain - and even 
improve - their friendly ties in spite of several events which might have undermined 
the basis of their friendship. Particularly, since September 11, 2001, China has con-
demned various incidents in its Muslim province of Xinjiang as connected to the 
global jihad, often holding Pakistan-based Uyghur militants responsible and accus-
ing Islamabad of not doing enough to prevent violence from spreading into Chinese 
territory. Within a scenario of growing insecurity for the whole region, in this paper 
I show how China’s influence in Pakistan goes well beyond the mere government-
to-government level. Particularly, I address the hitherto unstudied case of the Uy-
ghur community of Pakistan, the Kashgaris, a group of migrants who left Xinjiang 
over the course of the last century. This paper, based on four months of fieldwork in 
Pakistan, aims principally at offering an overview of the history and current situa-
tion of the Uyghur community of Pakistan. It thus first examines the migration of 
the Uyghur families to Pakistan according to several interviews with elder members 
of the community. Secondly, it addresses some recent developments within the 
community, and focuses particularly on the influence China is exercising over it 
since the creation of the Overseas Chinese Association in 2003. Eventually, it sug-
gests that since the opening of the Karakoram Highway in 1982 a variety of factors - 
among which figures primarily this recent Chinese interest - have caused an im-
portant political divide within the community, and brought to a re-definition of the 
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China and Pakistan share a common border, formally established in 1963, and a 
close friendship which, to a certain extent, is a direct consequence of that agree-
ment. Since then, and particularly over the course of the last two decades, leaders 
of both countries have not missed the opportunity to remark that their relation is 
“higher than the Himalaya and deeper than the Indian Ocean”, and even “sweeter 
than honey”.1 To a certain extent this pompous vocabulary seems to take concrete 
form in various coordinated projects, and thus in the constant effort to improve the 
economic ties between the two countries. Obviously, the most outstanding result of 
this relationship is represented by the Karakoram Highway (KKH), which connects 
Kashgar, in China’s Xinjiang region, to Islamabad through the 4,693-meter high 
Khunjerab Pass. The road, open to civilian traffic since 1982, is today the main ele-
ment of another major project, the so-called “economic corridor” which should 
connect Xinjiang to the Chinese-built Gwadar port, in the Baluchistan province of 
Pakistan.  
Somewhat surprisingly the two countries managed to maintain - and even improve, 
if possible - their friendly ties in spite of several events which might have under-
mined the basis of their friendship. Particularly, since September 11, 2001, China 
has condemned various incidents in its Muslim province of Xinjiang as connected to 
the global jihad. Chinese authorities individuated in the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) a major threat to stability in Xinjiang, pointing out that this Uy-
ghur terrorist organization is based in the north of Pakistan, in the lawless areas 
which border Afghanistan. In a few cases, Chinese authorities went as far as to di-
rectly blaming Pakistan for not doing enough to prevent violence from spreading 
into Chinese territory, and despite the lack of evidence provided Islamabad has re-
peatedly stressed its commitment to fight the ETIM and any other Uyghur terrorist 
organization active on its soil. 
Today, as tensions in Xinjiang seem to be once again arising, and with the questions 
raised by the upcoming withdrawal of United States-led forces from Afghanistan, in 
this paper I show how China’s influence in Pakistan goes well beyond the mere gov-
ernment-to-government level. Particularly, I address the hitherto unstudied case of 
the Uyghur community of Pakistan, the Kashgaris, a group of migrants who left Xin-
jiang over the course of the last century. This paper, based on four months of field-
work in Pakistan between February and June 2013, aims principally at offering an 
overview of the situation of the Uyghur community of Pakistan, and it is thus divid-
ed in two parts. In the first part I examine the migration of the Uyghur families to 
Pakistan according to several interviews with elder members of the community. In 
the second half I analyze the current situation of the community, and particularly 
                       






the influence China is exercising over it since the creation of the Overseas Chinese 
Association in 2003. More generally, I eventually suggest that since the opening of 
the Karakoram Highway a variety of factors have caused an important political di-
vide within the community, and brought to a re-definition of the Kashgaris’ identity 




2. Uyghurs and Kashgaris 
 
The Uyghurs are one of the recognized 55 ethnic minorities (shǎoshù mínzú) in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and mostly live in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
mous Region (XUAR) where they make up for about the 44% of the population 
(down from 75% in 1953).2 The largest of China's administrative regions, Xinjiang 
borders eight countries - Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan and India. Most Uyghurs are Sunni Muslims, they speak a Turkic 
language very close to modern Uzbek, claim to be the original inhabitants of Xin-
jiang, and generally regard themselves as culturally and ethnically closer to their 
central Asian neighbours rather than to the Han Chinese which make up for the ma-
jority of China’s population. Over the last few decades, and in particular since the 
Beijing Olympic Games of 2008 and the Urumqi riots of 2009, Xinjiang and the Uy-
ghurs have repeatedly been at the centre of news and speculations in connection 
with several acts of violence and terrorism. Although most western experts agree 
that the roots of the problems are internal, and generally lies in China’s discrimina-
tory policies toward its ethnic minorities (Mackerras 2001; Millward 2004; Boving-
don 2010), PRC officials have blamed most attacks on Uyghur separatist groups 
abroad, particularly in Pakistan and Central Asia, where several thousand Uyghur 
expatriates live (Roberts 1998, 2012).  
 
Although an official estimate does not exist, there seem to be about 300 Uyghur 
families currently living in Pakistan. Roughly two thirds of them live in Rawalpindi, 
the others mostly in Gilgit, but a few families can also be found in Lahore, Karachi 
and Peshawar. Among them I have met labourers, businessmen, software engineers, 
university students and politicians. In Rawalpindi, the largest Uyghur community 
lives in Westridge, where many used to work in a wool mill owned by a now de-
ceased Uyghur migrant. After the mill closed, in the 1990s, many went to find jobs 
and - at times - housing in other parts of town, or even abroad, yet Westridge re-
mains today the heart of the Uyghur community in Pakistan. They all moved to Pa-
kistan from Xinjiang - or what was known as Chinese (or Eastern) Turkestan - be-
tween the 1930s and the 1990s, sometimes together with other families who con-
tinued their journeys toward other countries: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and 
the United States in particular. In today’s Pakistan, those Uyghur migrants are well 
integrated within the local communities where they live, and if in some cases they 
are still referred to as “Turki” or “Kashgari”, in other cases people do not even seem 
to know about their background.  
                       
2 For an introduction to the history of Xinjiang and its current situation see Millward (2007); Starr (2004). 






In this work I refer to the Uyghurs of Pakistan as “Kashgaris”. As it will become clear 
throughout the paper, not all of them refer to themselves as Kashgaris. Some use 
the word “Turki”, others “Uyghurs”, others “ex-Chinese” or, even, “Chinese”. In this 
paper I refer to them, however, as Kashgaris, partly because it is the most used, and 
partly because the other ethnonyms carry a specific political meaning. “Turki”, for 
instance, is generally connected with separatist and pan-turkic movements in Xin-
jiang, and the expressions “Turkestan” and “East-Turkestan” have been banned by 
the PRC. Echoes of this have reached Pakistan as well. In the Kashgari neighbour-
hood in Westridge, the local mosque used to be called, in their honour, “Turkestani”, 
until the local authorities under pressure from the Chinese government decided to 
change the name. The Kashgaris, then, are not only well aware of how politically 
charged those expressions are, but also sensitive to the influence Chinese authori-
ties seem to have over the local, Pakistani government. Both the expression “ex-
Chinese” and “Chinese”, on the other hand, seem to be a recent development con-
nected with the institution, in Pakistan, of an Overseas Chinese Association. As it 
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will become clear throughout the paper, the Overseas Chinese Association has con-
tributed to the redefinition of Kashgari identity, and to its division along political 
lines. Most Kashgaris who refer to themselves as “ex-Chinese”, in this sense, are 
very close to the activities of the Association, and thus to the Chinese embassy in 
Islamabad.  
 
The word Kashgari, eventually, comes from the city of Kashgar, which is not where 
most Kashgaris are from, but which gave its name to the whole community. One of 
the reasons for this might be that the ethnonym “Uyghur” became used in Xinjiang 
only in the 1930s, as it was introduced by Soviet and Chinese ethnographers to de-
fine the Turkic-speaking inhabitants of the south of Xinjiang, which at that time re-
ferred to themselves either as “Turki” (from their language family), “Muslim” (from 
their religion), or according to the city they were from: “Kashgari” (Kashgarlik); 
“Khotani” (Khotanlik); “Yarkandi” (Yarkandlik), and so on (Gladney 1990, 1998). For 
instance then, in the British sources on Xinjiang-Ladakh trade, Turkic traders from 
the southern oasis of Xinjiang were either called “Turki” or “Yarkandi”, as Yarkand 
was one of the main hubs of the trade and, likely, where most traders were from 
(Shaw 1871; Knight 1893, Warikoo 1996, Thampi 2010). In the case of Pakistan it is 
likely that most Uyghur migrants became known as Kashgaris for the simple reason 
that Kashgar was - and still is - the main hub of China-Pakistan trade, the closest 
destination for Pakistan traders and, inevitably, Xinjiang’s most famous city in Paki-
stan. Although, then, many migrants were originally from Yarkand, Khotan, Artush 
and other oasis, it was the fame of Kashgar that gave them their name, with which 
many ended up identifying themselves. 
 
According to my interviews, since the earliest migrants in the 1940s the Kashgaris 
managed to remain united and maintained a specific, Kashgari, identity. Although it 
is virtually impossible to verify the validity of what might be interpreted as an imag-
ined, retrospective narrative, there are a few indications that support it, at least 
partly. Most Kashgari families, in fact, seem to have married within the community, 
and I was often told that as a result now the Kashgaris were “one big family”, as 
they all are related to each other in some way. Most Kashgaris, moreover, seem to 
maintain close contacts with other Kashgari families living in different cities within 
Pakistan, and although I could not witness it I was told that members of the com-
munity usually get together during special occasions, such as weddings and religious 
festivals. And yet, at the same time, I was often told that, until recently, the Kash-
garis did not have any awareness about their history and culture, nor about their 
distinctiveness in both China and Pakistan. This seems to have started to change 
only recently, particularly as after the Karakoram Highway was opened (1982) many 
Kashgaris managed to travel back to their homeland, while thousands of Xinjiang 
Uyghurs visited Pakistan for different reasons. In Pakistan, those people did not only 
bring new Chinese goods and information about relatives and friends in Xinjiang, 
but also a new, well-defined Uyghur identity: something that did not exist at the 
time of the first migrants, in the 1940s. Now, by the 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Kashgaris are not only facing a changed political landscape and renewed relations 
with Xinjiang, but are also struggling to place themselves, as Kashgaris, in a context 
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which defines them either as Uyghurs, Overseas Chinese, or Pakistani. In this sense, 
the Kashgari community had to face an incredible challenge, namely that of placing 
itself with its fragmentary and limited history, within established narratives of eth-
nic, national and political affiliation. I argue that the various, ongoing struggles 
which now seem to torment the community are precisely the result of this encoun-
ter, leading to directions which are still unclear.  
 
A final point, eventually, has to be made about the existence of the Kashgaris as a 
“community”, as I will often refer to them throughout this paper. It could be argued, 
in fact, that by seeing themselves as a community, the Kashgaris are only projecting 
an a posteriori, constructed image over their past, a retrospective narrative of some 
kind. Although I find this to be an important point, and one that surely needs fur-
ther inquiry, it is not the object of this paper, and the questions it arises cannot be 
answered based on the data that I have collected. Answering this question, then, 
would require further fieldwork and analysis, its scope being well beyond the aims 
of my research. The existence of the Kashgaris as a community, then, is not simply 
taken for granted in this paper, but must be rather understood as a temporary con-
struction, an oversimplification perhaps, surely a mean toward the main objective 
of the paper: an introduction to the history, lives and aspirations of this group of 
migrants. In order to do so I shall, as anticipated, start from the very beginning of 





As it emerged from my interviews the migration of most Kashgari families occurred 
out of self-initiative. Even when the border was officially sealed some families man-
aged to climb across the high passes of the Karakoram into Pakistan, yet the migra-
tion did not happen in a political vacuum, and various circumstances affected the 
process. The China-Pakistan border, in other words, remains necessarily porous, 
and if its closure did not effectively stop people from crossing - or trying to cross - it, 
its opening in certain historical moments certainly facilitated the movement. Hence 
keeping in mind that people kept crossing the Karakoram passes throughout the 
whole 20th century, in this section I am going to identify several moments when 
this occurred on a larger scale, and I shall accordingly discuss various stories that I 
have collected during my fieldwork.3 I should also point out that in this work I limit 
my analysis to the migration out of today’s Xinjiang toward today’s Pakistan, and 
thus do not aim at writing a comprehensive history of cross-border mobility during 
those decades.4 
 
Early  migration 
The earlier Kashgari migrants I interviewed moved to Pakistan just before the parti-
tion of the sub-continent (1947) and the foundation of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na (1949). Many, simply, left Xinjiang for the hajj and could not go back because the 
border was sealed, while others decided to stay in Pakistan for their faith or their 
fear of the communists. I was for instance told that in 1948-9 about 500 people 
moved to Pakistan from Yarkand, apparently afraid of the People’s Liberation Army 
is advance in Xinjiang. Some of them were rich families of traders with an estab-
lished network of contacts in the region, others were farmers with little or no expe-
rience of the world outside of their native villages. For all of them the journey was 
not easy, and at least 100 people died during the two-month trek from Yarkand to 
Gilgit. Those who made it, eventually, settled in Parri, a small village south of Gilgit, 
along today’s Karakoram Highway, where they built houses and began farming. 
Many more, I was told, died because of the different environmental conditions, the 
food and the altitude - although, in fact, Parri is only about 1.500 meters above sea 
level. After a few years, however, water scarcity in Parri forced most Kashgari fami-
lies to leave the village, and as many moved to Gilgit others went to Rawalpindi, to 
the extent that today not one family of Kashgaris lives in Parri anymore. Other Uy-
ghurs who moved during those years went straight to live in Gilgit, and at least a 
couple of them opened nan bakeries and mantu5  shops, which are still much ap-
preciated by locals in today’s Gilgit. 
                       
3 Some of those stories have appeared in a short piece I wrote for The Diplomat (Rippa 2013). 
4 For an overview of Xinjiang’s relations with its neighbouring countries see Roberts 2004. 
5 Manta, in Uyghur, a typical kind of dumplings usually filled with lamb meat and onions very common in Xin-




Many, for those very reasons, moved in the years following the establishment of 
the PRC, when the new government did not control Xinjiang’s border and crossing 
was still easy. Frequently mentioned in the course of my interviews was for instance 
an uprising which took place in Khotan in 1954 (Dillon 2004: 54), after which many 
Uyghurs involved decided to leave Xinjiang fearing repercussions for them and their 
families. Thus according to my sources and to Rahman’s (2005) account, many Uy-
ghur families moved to Pakistan in those years, between 1954 and 1956 (50).  
 
Most Kashgaris, moreover, seem to have moved to Pakistan during the 11 years of 
Ayub Khan’s presidency, between 1958 and 1969. It was precisely the second presi-
dent of Pakistan who facilitated their transfer to Pakistan, a movement which many 
considered a “return” rather than a migration. As Abdulaziz, a Kashgari trader from 
Gilgit, told me during one interview: “There are four kinds of us [Kashgaris]: those 
who are originally Pathan, those who are originally from Baltistan, and those who 
are originally from [Indian] Kashmir. And there are those, like us, who are 100% Uy-
ghurs” (July 18, 2013). In fact, most Kashgaris seem to have south Asian origins, as 
before the 1940s it was not rare for Kashmiri or Pashtun traders to marry a Uyghur 
woman and move to south Xinjiang6. In most cases it was precisely the fact that 
those migrants carried a British passport that allowed them, eventually, to move 
back to Pakistan during Ayub Khan’s government.  
 
A few elderly Kashgaris I have interviewed in Rawalpindi still remembered their 
journey through the Karakoram. They all gave me similar accounts not only of the 
long and tiring route, but also of the reasons they decided to leave Xinjiang: their 
family’s properties nationalized by the Maoist state, the famine brought by the fail-
ure of the Great Leap Forward, restrictions to their religious practices. They were all 
fleeing a Communist state for a Muslim country, and according to Ayub Khan’s poli-
cy they were immediately given Pakistani citizenship and 500 rupees each at their 
arrival in their new country. They all, eventually, managed to go back to Xinjiang 
and visit what was left of their families only two decades later, once the KKH was 
open. 
To add even more complexity, however, I have also met families who managed to 
leave Xinjiang during the 1960s without having any previous relations with the sub-
continent. In many cases, moreover, they did not move directly to Pakistan, but 
went to Afghanistan which, in those years, had a more relaxed immigration policy. 
For most, Afghanistan represented simply a step in a longer trip, of which usually 
the final destinations were Turkey, Europe or the United States. I have also met a 
couple of men who, however, ended up staying in Afghanistan for most of their 
lives, struggling through the country’s troublesome history. Eventually, they both 
moved to Pakistan during the last two decades, as many other Afghans did, and 
ended up in Rawalpindi, in the Kashgari neighbourhood. 
 
                       
6 On trans-Himalayan trade and the role of Indian traders in Xinjiang see in particular Warikoo 1996; Thampi 




The Karakoram Highway 
Given the little historic material in our possession, the lack of a comprehensive sur-
vey, the diversity of each individual story, and the unique opinion that each Kash-
gari seems to have about the migration from Xinjiang, it is simply not possible to 
map out with precision the origins and the current composition of the Kashgari 
community. The situation, moreover, seems to remain fluid and susceptible to addi-
tional changes, as since the Karakoram Highway was opened a new wave of Uyghur 
migrants moved to Pakistan. In this section I analyze precisely the impact of the 
Karakoram Highway on the Kashgaris, this time not only in terms of mono-
directional migration but rather in terms of bi-directional movements across the 
China-Pakistan border. 
 
Although the Karakoram Highway was completed in 1978, it was open to civilian 
traffic only since 1982 (Kreutzmann 1991: 725). For many Kashgaris it was the first 
opportunity they had in over three decades to travel to their homeland, and most 
of them took their families with them for the journey. Hence the opening of the 
KKH had a significant impact not only of the whole economy of the mountain re-
gions, as it has already been documented,7 but also on the lives of the few hundred 
families of Kashgaris living in Pakistan. The Highway, moreover, opened up new 
possibilities for mobility across the Karakoram, and a variety of people took ad-
vantage of the political relaxation in the PRC and travelled to and from Pakistan for 
different purposes.  
 
Although the focus of this paper are the Kashgaris, in what follows I shall briefly 
analyze the various groups of Xinjiang Uyghurs which, for various reasons, visited 
Pakistan since the opening of the Karakoram Highway. Although only few of them 
settled in Pakistan, they generally interacted with the Kashgaris, and thus had a sig-
nificant impact on this community. Eventually, I shall briefly address the issue of 
trans-border trade, and the role that the Kashgaris played in it.  
 
Pilgrims  
As during most of the history of interactions between Central and South Asia, with 
the opening of the KKH traders and pilgrims became once again the main force of 
cross-border mobility in the area. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and, 
particularly, of Mao’s death (1976), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) moved to-
ward more tolerant policies in an attempt to regain support among the non-Han 
people of Xinjiang. Together with a return to a non-assimilationist policy, the early 
1980s marked a period of religious and cultural freedom for the Uyghurs. As a con-
sequence thousands of mosques and madrassas were reopened or constructed, and 
                       
7 For an analysis of the construction of the Karakoram Highway and its impact on the economy of Gilgit-Baltistan 




many took advantages of this situation to conduct the hajj pilgrimage which was 
resumed in 1979 after fifteen years of interruption (Shichor 2005: 122; also Waite 
2006: 254-5). Pakistan, like in the 1930s, maintained a major role as a transit point 
for Uyghur pilgrims, and Islamabad also allowed many of them to study in its uni-
versities, and to settle as Pakistani citizens. In 1985 about 1200 pilgrims crossed into 
Pakistan in order to reach Saudi Arabia for the hajj. As in the past they also brought 
various (Chinese) goods with them, and thus through this informal, individual form 
of trade covered part of their expenses (Kreutzmann 1991: 725).  
 
Once in Pakistan those pilgrims usually had to wait a few weeks for their Saudi visas 
to be processed in Islamabad, and an important network of support was developed 
by the local Kashgari community. Haider (2005), in an article on the Karakoram 
Highway partly based on fieldwork among Pakistani traders in Xinjiang, claims that 
“most of the Uighur settlements that can be found in Pakistan today were estab-
lished in the 1980s as transit points on the way to Mecca” (525). According to my 
own interviews in Pakistan this seems to be incorrect, as most Uyghur pilgrims end-
ed up staying either in a Kashgari neighbourhood, or in specific “houses” set up with 
the help of the Kashgari community. The pilgrims, in other words, favoured the help 
of the Kashgari network in settlements that existed since well before the opening of 
the KKH. 
 
Particularly significant in this regard was the area of the so-called China Market, in 
Rawalpindi (see below). Here wealthy Uyghurs from Saudi Arabia donated two 
houses – named Khotan House and Kashgar House – which functioned as free-of-
charge hotels for Uyghur pilgrims. Opened in 1986, Khotan House is a three-floor 
building with a few dozen rooms overlooking a small courtyard. Each room has two 
bunk beds and a small table, while half of the courtyard is occupied by a pray 
ground covered with small rugs. The only piece of decoration is an old picture show-
ing General Zia-ul-Haq and the Chinese consul welcoming a group of Uyghur pil-
grims. During my visit I was told that at times pilgrims were so numerous that many 
had to sleep on the naked floor in the rooms and in the courtyard. None of them 
was ever charged a single rupee for their stay, yet local Uyghurs made a profit in 
other ways, such as providing food, guidance and translation services to the pilgrims. 
In 2006, the Chinese and Saudi governments signed an agreement that allowed pil-
grims to fly directly from Beijing, and Uyghurs from Xinjiang stopped going to Paki-
stan on their way to the hajj. Kashgar House and Khotan House closed after 20 years, 
and the buildings are now used by Kashgari traders as warehouses. 
 
Militants 
The Soviet war in Afghanistan, when China joined the anti-Russian coalition, was 
another factor that contributed to the movement of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs to, and 
through, Pakistan. As reported by Fuller and Lipman (2004), it has been estimated 
by Chinese sources that “as many as 10,000 Uyghurs had travelled to Pakistan for 




not mention is that during the time of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, Beijing 
provided over $400 million in military aid to the mujāhidīn (Cooley 2002: 60). Ac-
cording to Cooley, China provided the anti-Soviet jihadists with arms and advisors, 
all flowing into Afghanistan through the established network of the refugee camps 
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Moreover, in 1985, training camps were opened near Kash-
gar and Khotan, where militants learned the use of “Chinese weapons, explosives 
and PLA [People’s Liberation Army] combat tactics” (Cooley 2002: 59). Although it 
remains difficult to estimate how many Uyghurs were actually trained in Pakistan 
during these years, and their experiences go far beyond the purpose of this paper, 
during my interviews in Pakistan the issue of Uyghur militants and mujāhidīn came 
up frequently, as I shall discuss later in this paper.8 
 
Late  migrants  
Only a small minority of today’s Kashgaris moved to Pakistan after the opening of 
the KKH. I have personally met only a few of them, in Gilgit and Rawalpindi, and 
they generally seemed to have moved for religious and political reasons. Particularly 
interesting, and exceptional in several ways, was the case of a Shia family originally 
from Yarkand who moved to Gilgit in 19869. Since the father was a government offi-
cial, he and all his family managed to obtain passports, with which they travelled to 
Pakistan on a three-month visa. Once there, they kept extending it, until the two 
brothers married local Shia women and by 1999 they all obtained Pakistani citizen-
ship. When they came to Pakistan they were only five but now they are a big family 
of fourteen, living in a big house purchased with the income of two “mantu” shops. 
Moreover, they are “Sayyid”, descendants of the Prophet, and thus, I was told, were 
always well treated and respected, and by no means regret the decision of moving 
to Gilgit.  
 
In Rawalpindi, on the other hand, a few families migrated to Pakistan during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. I was told that the last family move in 1997, and that 
nobody managed to come and settle in Pakistan after that. Although, in fact, I did 
not meet anybody who came after 1997, I cannot exclude with certainty that it did 
not happen, yet it seems likely that most of the Uyghurs who came to Pakistan after 
the Karakoram Highway was open and did not go back to Xinjiang, ended up living 
in other countries, mostly Turkey, Germany, and the United States. Pakistan, in oth-
                       
8 Various analysts (Rashid 2002: 204, Christoffersen 2007: 52), have highlighted the presence of Uyghur mili-
tants in Pakistan since the 1980s, often adding that many were enrolled as students in local madrassas. Unfor-
tunately we do not seem to have enough information to either sustain or dismiss those claims, particularly 
when it comes to the current capability of those groups, and the assertive language of Rashid and others has 
thus been criticized by several Xinjiang experts (Bovingdon 2010: 135-6). For a thoughtful critique of the existing 
literature on Uyghur terrorist groups see Roberts (2012), who also highlight how, despite the lack of evidence, 
the narrative of “Uyghur terrorism” has emerged as an established reality. 
9 Uyghurs are virtually all Sunni, and with the exception of the Tajik Ismaili community in the area of Tashkurgan, 
Shia presence in China has traditionally been considered virtually irrelevant (Israeli 2002: 147-164). The com-
munity to which this family used to belong, then, is that of a small – and hitherto unstudied – Shia group in the 




er words, became a gateway not only for Uyghur pilgrims, but also for asylum seek-
ers and migrants headed to countries further west. According to my experience in 
south Xinjiang, in fact, although most Uyghurs - particularly of the youngest genera-
tions - dream of going abroad, Pakistan does not present a popular destination.  
 
Business  across  the  Karakoram:  the  
role  of  the  Kashgaris  in  China-Pakistan 
trade 
Most Kashgaris took the opportunity offered by the opening of the KKH to visit their 
families back in Xinjiang, and many of them used their connections and language 
skills to launch profitable import-export businesses. Back then, Sultan Khan, a 
preeminent member of Gilgit’s Kashgari community, told me, “the Xinjiang govern-
ment invited us to visit China and do business there”. This move was part of a 
greater strategy, as since the beginning of the period of reforms the Chinese gov-
ernment encouraged minorities to develop trade relations with the neighbouring 
countries (Haider 2005: 525). Deng Xiaoping viewed this as a process that may help 
the minorities’ modernisation, as well as a way to develop more friendly relations 
with the neighbouring Muslim countries (Dreyer 1993: 377). Many Uyghurs in Xin-
jiang took advantage from those new policies and re-established a lucrative trade 
on the routes that connected Xinjiang with its neighbourhoods in the north and in 
the west (Roberts 2004: 218-225; Millward 2007: 288-93). Others - a minority com-
pared to those who went to Central Asia - focused their attention and investment 
towards Pakistan. Yet an important part of the Xinjiang-Pakistan trade volume in 
those early years seemed to be in the hand of the Kashgaris. 
 
Similarly to what happens today, the bulk of the trade consisted of Chinese con-
sumer goods, crockery, shoes and garments produced in the south of China and 
often brought to the markets in Xinjiang by Uyghur traders. Another major import 
was silk, and this seems to be the main product traded by the Kashgaris I have met 
in Pakistan. In the China Market in Rawalpindi a few of the silk shops are still owned 
by Kashgaris, but I was regularly told that due to the depreciation of the Pakistani 
rupee and the growing number of Pashtun traders, this business was not as profita-
ble as it used to be. In fact, since the late 1990s, Uyghurs and Kashgaris both lost 
their respective advantages in the Karakoram Highway trade, and were soon re-
placed by Han Chinese companies and Pashtun traders. Today, only a minority of 
Kashgaris is still involved with cross-border trade, while only a handful of Uyghurs 
from Xinjiang still manage to visit Pakistan regularly for business purposes.  
 
This recent dynamic is quite visible in the China Market itself. The China Market 
occupies the southern part of Gordon College Road, in the centre of Rawalpindi. 
Like other bazaars in town, the China Market is made up of different buildings and 




is frenetic, with cars and motorbikes dangerously driving through the crowds, young 
boys carrying trays with half dozen chai cups from the shops to the small stall where 
an older man is busy making the tea and pouring it. Nearby, a famous restaurants 
attracts hungry customers lining up for its famous pilau, while outside boxes of 
goods are continuously loaded and unloaded to and from all kinds of vehicles. The 
China Market, in other words, resembles any other market in Rawalpindi, if it was 
not for one particular element: all commodities sold and exchanged here are im-
ported from China, either from the KKH or via sea route, from Karachi. The origin of 
the goods is remarked by the names of most shops and malls, which make the China 
Market rather unique: “China town”, “China shopping center”, “China store”, “New 
China market”, “Beijing shopping center”, “Uromqi [sic!] Plaza”, and so on. Today, 
most shops in the China market still deal with silk and fabric, yet a variety of other 
products is also present: stationery, toys, cookware, furniture, plastic flowers and 
other kinds of decorations, fake bags and wallets, and so on. After several visits to 
the China Market and interviews with various businessmen there, I was able to con-
clude that not only the overwhelming majority of the goods was imported through 
Karachi, but also that Kashgari traders represented only a minority. Most traders, in 
fact, were either Pashtun or Punjabi, with only a few Kashgaris and Gilgit-Baltistani.  
 
To conclude, it would be difficult to underestimate the impact of the opening of the 
Karakoram Highway on the Kashgari community. The road, together with the new 
policies brought about by Deng Xiaoping, allowed many Kashgaris to travel back to 
their homeland, often for the first time, and for many Xinjiang Uyghurs to travel 
abroad, both for business and pilgrimage. Those Xinjiang Uyghurs were an im-
portant source of information for the Kashgaris. Their tales about Xinjiang, I was 
repeatedly told, were often the only information Kashgaris managed to have from 
Xinjiang, and they served the important purpose of re-establishing a connection 
between this small group of people and its geographical and cultural heartland. Uy-
ghur militants, on the other hand, had a significant, yet in this case largely indirect, 
impact on the community. Because of them, the Kashgaris are often perceived - by 
Xinjiang Uyghurs and other Uyghur groups abroad - as dangerous and, as I was per-
sonally told several times, “religious extremists”. Although I could not find any di-
rect connection between the Kashgaris and the Uyghur militants allegedly active in 
the north of Pakistan, certainly the Kashgaris were affected in terms of their reputa-
tion, and they seemed very well aware of it. Eventually, as I shall show in the next 
section, the opening of the KKH brought the Chinese state back into the Kashgaris’ 




4. China and the Kashgaris 
 
Since they settled in Pakistan most Kashgaris had virtually nothing to do with the 
Chinese government. Most of them obtained Pakistani citizenship as they arrived in 
their new country, and did not seek any relations with PRC authorities. Nor did Bei-
jing. In the course of my interviews I was repeatedly told that, until recently, the 
Uyghur community of Pakistan seemed of little or no concern to China. It was only 
in 1988 that the Chinese government sent its first Uyghur official to the Islamabad 
Embassy, with the specific purpose of dealing “with affairs related to Uighur expat-
riates” (Rahman 2005: 1). This decision did not end well for the Chinese authorities, 
as the young Uyghur diplomat left his post after only 13 months, going on hiding as 
an Afghan refugee in Peshawar and eventually obtaining asylum from Switzerland 
where he wrote his memoir (Rahman 2005). Most Kashgaris I interviewed, moreo-
ver, agreed that Beijing began to actively interact with their community only after 
the 9/11 terrorist attack to the United States, when Pakistan suddenly found itself - 
once again - involved with a war in nearby Afghanistan, and the Kashgaris became 
one of the main concerns in China’s own “war on terror”. China’s interests in the 
Kashgaris became eventually particularly evident in the months that preceded the 
2008 Beijing Olympics, when rumours of Pakistan-based Uyghur terrorists ready to 
target the Games were rampant.10   
 
In this context, Pakistan’s strategic importance for China significantly increased 
(Yang and Siddiqi 2011), yet at the same time the instability of the country and Chi-
na’s concern with the situation in Xinjiang brought to a redefinition of China’s poli-
cies toward its “all weather” ally. Duchâtel (2011), for instance, individuates two 
main adjustments: sustaining a pro-China “United Front”, and reassessing Pakistan’s 
strategic value. If the second “adjustment” is of little concern here, what Duchâtel 
calls “United Front” consists essentially of cultivating relations with a wide range of 
actors, from civilian parties to the military, to religious groups and important mem-
bers of the civil society. This is generally done through the Chinese embassy in Is-
lamabad, and builds upon the principle of “neutrality”, which means that when an 
internal conflict emerges China refrains from taking side and thus avoids making 
enemies (551-3). It consists, in other words, of a network of relationships cultivated 
through time and skilful diplomacy, that the Chinese government can use in time of 
needs. As part of this effort, I argue, China has since the early 2000s sought to influ-
ence the Uyghur community of Pakistan through the institution of the “Overseas 
Chinese Association”. 
 
                       
10 In 2008 several bombs were detonated on buses in Urumqi and Kunming, with the Turkestan Islamic Party 
(TIP) claiming responsibility, while in March 2008 a Uyghur woman travelling on a Pakistani passport was 
stopped from lighting a container filled with petrol on a flight from Urumqi to Beijing. For an analysis of those 
incidents see Pantucci and Schwarck 2014: 10. 
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The Overseas  Chinese  Associat ion 
Virtually all the Kashgaris I have talked to in Pakistan were involved with the activi-
ties of the Overseas Chinese Association, which many, particularly in Rawalpindi, 
called “ex-Chinese Association”. The “Association” does not have an office, but it 
has two presidents and two chairmen, for Gilgit and Rawalpindi, respectively. It was 
them who managed the money provided by the Chinese embassy, which they had 
to distribute to the community.  
 
The Association was created in 2003. Sultan Khan, chairman of the Association for 
Gilgit-Baltistan, told me that it was the “Chinese High Commission in Pakistan” 
which asked them to form “an association of ex-Chinese”. The embassy, Sultan 
Khan explained, wanted to know the strength of the community so that they could 
economically support it. I was then told that since 2003 the Association has received 
about 16 million rupees ($150,000) from the Chinese embassy. Sultan Khan also 
confirmed that in 2013 alone the Chinese High Commission in Pakistan released the 
amount of 4 million rupees, which in Gilgit was distributed in the following way: 
5.000 for each student and 10.000 each to about thirty Kashgari widows. Although 
there is not a significant community of Kashgaris living outside of Rawalpindi and 
Gilgit, various members of the Association told me that they were in contacts with 
families in Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and even Chitral. I once was even shown a list 
with the names of about two dozen Kashgari Children from Chitral, who were also 
receiving some financial help for their school fees.  
 
Not everybody in the community, however, is pleased with the conduct of the Asso-
ciation and the way it deals with the funding it receives from the Chinese embassy. 
A Kashgari man whose family moved from Yarkand in 1952 and who preferred to 
stay anonymous, told me his opinion - which I have then found shared by many 
others - in the following words. “The Chinese government isn’t really doing anything 
for us,” he whispered as we chatted in a small teahouse in the centre of Gilgit, “they 
give money to some people, but then these people use the money for themselves 
and the others don’t get anything.” The Association, in fact, operates with little 
transparency. Nobody was either able or willing to tell me how the money was dis-
tributed, or based on what criteria some people received scholarships and benefits. 
Everybody, however, directed me to one person: Raza Khan. 
 
Raza Khan, whose mother was Uyghur and father Pashtun, has been the leader of 
the Overseas Chinese Association since its foundation. A wealthy businessman and 
owner of a steel mill and other activities in Islamabad, Raza Khan was well known 
and respected by most of the Kashgaris I met. Unfortunately, he died during the 
time of my fieldwork, and I only had the opportunity to speak briefly on the phone 
with him. I learned, however, that he directly received the funding for the Associa-
tion from the Chinese embassy in Islamabad, and that he personally distributed it to 
local leaders in Rawalpindi and Gilgit. 
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After Raza Khan’s death, he was replaced as president of the Association by his 
younger brother, Nasir Khan, who was also chosen by the Chinese ambassador in 
Pakistan. The chairman of the Rawalpindi section of the Association is Abdul Ha-
keem Haji, a respected elderly member of the community whose family owns a fab-
ric shop in the China Market, at the ground floor of the Khotan House. Unfortunate-
ly, due to his age Abdul Hakeem rarely visits his shop, and although I pressed his 
relatives asking for an interview with him in several occasions, I had to eventually 
realize that he simply did not want to talk to me about the Association. I had much 
less problems with the Gilgit section of the Association, as I talked to both the pres-
ident, Abdul Qayyum, and the chairman, Sultan Khan, on several occasions. I met 
both of them in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, which due to their businesses is where 
they spend most part of the year, but in Gilgit I have managed to talk to several of 
their relatives and others involved with the Association. I thus managed to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of how the Association works, and, most importantly, of 
how it is differently perceived by various groups within the community of Kashgaris.  
The main task of the Association was toward the education of the young sons and 
daughters of the Kashgaris. In this sense, all Kashgari kids in primary and middle 
school had their school fees paid, or at least partly covered, by the Association. In 
addition to this, the Association also claimed to provide financial help to Kashgari 
widows and other needy members of the community, while also a limited number 
of scholarships for higher education in Beijing are available. If, then, the payment of 
school fees is well accepted by all Kashgaris, the criteria according to which other 
financial help and scholarship are provided are the source of important friction 
within the community. The main problem is that there does not seem to be any 
principle, or at least guideline, for the selection of the beneficiaries, and the whole 
process is far from transparent. 
 
Raza Khan’s most severe critic is surely Umer, who told me his story over the course 
of several meetings at his house in Rawalpindi. Umer’s family was originally from 
Kashgar, and moved to Pakistan in 1948. Born in Rawalpindi, he worked in Saudi 
Arabia with his brother for a few years, as many Pakistanis did in the 1970s and 
1980s. When he came back to Pakistan, between 1986 and 2006, he was in charge 
of Khotan House and Kashgar House. In 2008, Umer founded with his brother and 
four other people the Umer Uyghur Trust, with the aim of teaching Uyghur lan-
guage and culture to the youngest generations of Kashgaris in Rawalpindi. “Educa-
tion,” Umer said over lunch at his house, “is the basic right of every person. We just 
want to teach our culture and our language to our children.” With this purpose 
Umer opened a small school near his house, in Westridge, where most Kashgaris 
live. Soon after the school was opened he received several visits from different “Pa-
kistani agencies” pressuring him to close it, as, according to them, it was endanger-
ing the good relations between China and Pakistan. He told me that the agencies 
made him an offer in lieu of the Chinese embassy, that he would be given “financial 
aid” and benefits if he stopped his activities. He did not. Eventually, Umer claimed, 
under Chinese pressure a group of (Pakistani) men from some (Pakistani) agency 
came to the school and destroyed everything, while his name and that of his broth-
er were put on the Exit Control List, thus preventing them from leaving the country. 
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The story was picked up by Radio Free Asia,11 and their reports, together with a 
reportage by the Japanese NHK,12 a NBC News article13 and a few propagandistic 
Chinese language pieces14 are the only material available on the Kashgari communi-
ty. Umer was accused of carrying on illegal activities in his school, and of being in 
contact with Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), which the Chi-
nese government considers a terrorist organization and holds responsible for the 
deadly Urumqi riots of 2009 (Millward 2009, Roberts 2012).15 Umer, on the other 
hand, told me that his connection with Rebiya Kadeer and various Uyghur NGOs in 
Turkey had nothing to do with politics, and that he simply aims to learn about Uy-
ghur history and culture. 
 
At the time Umer’s school was forced to close, a new “Montessori school” opened 
in the neighbourhood. The principal of the school – a Punjabi man with little inter-
est in political feuds within the community of Kashgaris – told me that he was first 
contacted by Raza Khan and the Overseas Chinese Association in 2010. They were 
interested, he told me, in opening a school in the area for the children of the Kash-
gari families. They eventually found a way to collaborate, and with the financial as-
sistance of the Association the school is now moving into a new, four-floor building. 
The Chinese ambassador also visited the school, and donated 16 computers and 
books for the school’s library. At the time we spoke, the principal told me that 
about 150 “Ex-Chinese” children - as he called the Kashgaris - were currently en-
rolled in the school, all their fees and expenses paid by the Association. “We also 
                       
11“Language School Shuts Down”, May 20, 2010, Radio Free Asia  
(http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/pressured-05192010164138.html); “Uyghurs Face Travel Ban”, June 
23, 2011, Radio Free Asia (http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/pressured-05192010164138.html). 
12 The video is available on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPk-hP5t0M0. 
13 “Uyghurs - Precariously caught between two powers”, November 9, 2010, NBC News  
(http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/_news/2010/11/09/5435051-uighurs-precariously-caught-between-two-
powers) 
14 See for instance “Bājīsītǎn wéizú huárén lǐngxiù: Xīnjiāng wéizú rénguò de bǐ wǒmen hǎo (Pakistani Uyghur 
leader: Xinjiang Uyghurs live better than us)”, July 19, 2009, Global Times  
(http://www.chinaqw.com/hqhr/hrdt/200907/19/172004.shtml); “Zhù bājīsītǎn shǐguǎn yǔ wéizú tóngbāo gòng 
qìng zǎishēng jié (Embassy in Pakistan and Uyghur compatriots to celebrate Eid al-Adha)”, October 29, 2012, 
Ministry of Foreign Affair of the PRC  
(http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/gjhdq_603914/gj_603916/yz_603918/1206_604018/1206x2_604038/t983
165.shtml); “Zhù bājīsītǎn dàshǐ sūnwèidōng fù lā wǎ'ěr pǐn dì PEAK MONTESSORI xuéxiào kànwàng wéizú 
xuéshēng (Pakistan Ambassador Sun Weidong visits Uyghur students at Rawalpindi’s Peak Montessori school)”, 
December 31, 2013, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(http://pk.chineseembassy.org/chn/sghd/t1113620.htm). 
15 The World Uyghur Congress, founded in Munich in 2004, defines itself as an “umbrella organization” for ex-
iled Uyghur groups. According to its mission statement “The main objective of the WUC is to promote democra-
cy, human rights and freedom for the Uyghur people and use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to 
determine their political future” (the complete version of the WUC mission statement is available online: 
www.uyghurcongress.org). The current president of the WUC, Rebiya Kadeer, was elected in 2006. Rebiya Ka-
deer, once a successful Uyghur businesswoman, was arrested in 1999 for her activism, and released only in 
2005 under pressure from the United States, where she now lives in exile. The Chinese government, on the 
other hand, has added the WUC to its list of alleged terrorist organizations, and often accused the WUC of fo-
menting unrests in Xinjiang. For a comprehensive analysis of the WUC structure, its history and leadership, see 
Chen 2014; for an overview of Uyghur transnational organizations and their connection with both China and the 
WUC see Bovingdon 2010: 135-158. 
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have a plan to teach their language [Uyghur],” he told me, “but the Association is in 
charge of that and I honestly don’t know.” 
 
The school itself thus became a symbol of China-Pakistan friendship. Around the 
various buildings there are several posters showing the Pakistani and Chinese flags 
one beside the other, and in the principal’s office I noticed several pictures taken 
when the works on the new section of the school began. They showed the principal 
shaking hands with the former Chinese ambassador Liu Jian, with Raza Khan and 
Abdul Hakeem in the background. In one occasion the principal took me on a little 
tour of the various classes, where he would ask the little students “who is an ex-
Chinese?”, to which a group of kids would respond by raising their hands, telling me 
their names and confirming that they were, in fact, “ex-Chinese”.  
 
For some of the Kashgaris living in Westridge, however, the school was not only a 
symbol of friendship. As I was told by a few elder members of the community, 
through the school the Chinese were simply trying to “bribe” the Kashgaris, so that 
they would not think about the various injustices China was committing in Xinjiang. 
Umer, obviously, was particularly critical of the new school. “The only reason Raza 
Khan made that school is because we made our own school,” he told me angrily 
once. “The [Chinese] embassy is using Raza Khan, he does everything they tell him 
to do. The embassy told him that we were manipulating Uyghur children in our 
school, and he had to make a new one. And you know why? Because he’s a good 
businessman, and he has a lot of contacts with Chinese companies.” Umer, moreo-
ver, did not seem to believe that Uyghur language will ever be taught at the Mon-
tessori school. “Even if they were to teach Uyghur,” he complained, “they will teach 
their own version of what Uyghur culture is, not what it really is.”  
 
Umer has paid a personal price for his views and for his contacts with the WUC. Iso-
lated within the community, and unable to go abroad, he however continued the 
activities of his “Umer Uyghur Trust”, distributing food to poor Uyghur families and 
organizing get-togethers for the most important Muslim festivals. As I was writing 
this paper, in April 2014, he informed me that after he and his brother appealed to 
the competent authorities, their names were finally removed from the Exit Control 
List. In his words, he praised Pakistan’s independent justice system, and remarked 
his determination to continue promoting Uyghur language, culture and education. 
Because of his idea, Umer also suffered on a more personal level, as the attitude of 
most Kashgaris toward him has changed. He has always been a leading, respected 
figure within the community, yet since his problems with the Chinese embassy be-
gan, most people tend to avoid him, although many remain sympathetic with his 
views. He is not critical of them, he knows that many have ongoing businesses in 
and with China, and that he could cause them troubles. While I was in Rawalpindi 
he always invited me to his house, but preferred not to be seen with me outside, 
particularly in the China market area. “If other Uyghurs see you with me”, he told 
me, “they won’t talk to you anymore”. 
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5. Situating the Kashgaris 
 
Uyghurs or Kashgaris ,  (ex - )Chinese  or  
Pakistani?  
As we drank several cups of tea in the back of his new shop in the China Market, 
Rawalpindi, where he sells Swiss watches, Sultan Khan tried to explain the peculiar 
position of the Kashgaris. “Our fathers are from Pakistan and our mothers from Chi-
na,” he explained, “we belong to both countries and we represent an important 
bridge between them.” In the 1990s, for instance, he stressed that many Kashgaris 
used to work as interpreters and facilitators for the Uyghur pilgrims coming from 
Xinjiang. Others, like Sultan Khan himself, were doing business between the two 
countries. The in-between nature of the Kashgaris is difficult to contest. It emerges 
from their stories, and it is mirrored in their businesses and activities. It does not 
always represent, however, a comfortable situation. Abdullah, for instance, told me 
the following story. As many Kashgaris, Abdullah’s grandfather was a trader from 
Kashmir who settled in Yarkand, where Abdullah was born and raised before mov-
ing to Pakistan in 1967, when he was 15. He still remembers how, with his family, 
they climbed over the Karakoram range into Pakistan: “There was no proper road, 
we had to climb through narrow paths and I remember that we reached the border 
at sunset. Nobody was there, we slept under the open sky and in the morning we 
realized that my mother was dead. We buried her there, then we moved down to-
ward Gilgit.” Abdullah married shortly after he arrived in Rawalpindi, and began to 
work at a local factory. Poor and uneducated, he managed to make just enough to 
sustain his family. Local Pakistanis treated them well, he told me, but from the be-
ginning, for reasons probably due to their background and Central Asian look, they 
called them “Russians.” Now all he wants is good education for his children and 
grandchildren. By the end of his story, he was almost in tears: “I had no education in 
either China or Pakistan. I spent all my life in pain and anger. When I was young the 
Chinese snatched our land from my father, then they put him in jail. I came to Paki-
stan and people called me Russian, or Chinese. When I go to China they call me Pa-
kistani. I didn’t have a life or an identity (shanakht), only hatred (nafrat).”  
 
Sultan Khan and Abdullah embody, in a way, the two opposite outcomes of Kash-
garis’ transnationalism, of different identities as both an opportunity and a burden. 
They also represent only two examples of the multiple and fragmented views that 
the Kashgaris have of themselves. Abdul Qayyum, the president of the Gilgit section 
of the Association, for instance told me very clearly that he considered Xinjiang his 
motherland, and that he was grateful to the Chinese government for what it was 
doing not only in Pakistan, but in Xinjiang too, where he had travelled dozens of 
time. Without me asking anything, he tried to convince me that most Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang support the Chinese government, that rumours of opposition or terrorism 
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were spread by partisan Western media.16 In Pakistan too, he continued, the Kash-
gari families were not against the Chinese government, quite the contrary. He then 
went on praising the development of Xinjiang, claiming that “Kashgar, Yarkand, they 
are all developing. People in Tashkurgan are also very rich now. Fast development, 
they do a lot of business”. It was the typical rhetoric of the Chinese government, 
with some curious exaggerations, like when he told me that the first time he went 
to China, in 1983, he found it better than Europe, due to the wise communist policy 
of the PRC.  
 
On the other hand of the spectrum, Umer carefully distanced himself - and to a cer-
tain extent the whole community - from what Sultan Khan or Abdul Qayyum told 
me. Umer’s problems started when he first contacted Rebiya Kadeer and the World 
Uyghur Congress, and although Umer claimed that he simply wanted to “learn” 
about his culture so that he could teach the Kashgari families, he ended up being 
deeply involved in the political rhetoric that characterizes the WUC. “China don’t 
want us to teach the Uyghur culture”, he angrily told me, “the only reason Pakistani 
government and agencies are tormenting us is […] China. Pakistan is our own coun-
try, […] we are not against the Pakistani government, we are against the Chinese 
government”. Then, contrarily to what Abdul Qayyum has told me, he highlighted 
how discriminated Uyghurs were in “East Turkestan”, the lack of human rights in his 
homeland, and even told me an anecdote about his mother who was ill-treated at 
Urumqi airport only because of her origins and relation with Umer.  
 
Despite their different views, Umer and Abdul Qayyum share a similar past. Not 
only they are both the sons of migrants who came around the time of partition, but 
they both worked in Saudi Arabia for several years. They travelled to different coun-
tries, conducted business along the Karakoram Highway, and were involved with 
the thousands of Uyghur pilgrims who transited yearly through Pakistan. Yet at 
some point, for some reasons, their paths divided and went along different, oppo-
site lines.  
 
Moreover, between those two positions I have found a significant spectrum of opin-
ions among the many Kashgaris I have interviewed. Several members of the Associ-
ation, for instance, took good care in highlighting the point that the funding they 
were receiving were not coming from Beijing, but from the “Xinjiang government”, 
as to remark that their loyalty lied in the Western Regions of China, rather than at 
its political centre. One of them was Abdul Aziz, the only Kashgari I have met who 
was fluent in Mandarin. During a long conversation in his shop in Gilgit, where he 
sells blankets and cushions of all colours and sizes, he told me that his father came 
from Artush, near Kashgar, in 1949. He speaks Mandarin so well because he used to 
travel to China very often, on business, but now he has stopped doing that as there 
                       
16 In this particular conversation Abdul Qayyum was referring both to the coverage of Xinjiang by western media, 
and to the two Radio Free Asia articles about the Kashgari that I have already quoted in a previous footnote. He 
repeatedly stressed that “western media” were to blame for projecting a false image of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang 
and in Pakistan, with the only objective to destabilizing China’s growth to the West’s advantage. 
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was too little margin for profit. He told me that his family left “because of Mao”, 
stressing the communists’ repressive religious policies and what he called the state-
sponsored Han “invasion” of Xinjiang. He then told me that Xinjiang used to be 
called East Turkestan, and that he considered himself a “Turki”. We also talked 
about the Association, of which he was a member. He stressed that when he went 
to the Chinese embassy in Islamabad he was told that funding was coming from the 
Xinjiang government. The lack of a direct relation with Beijing, somehow, seemed to 
reassure him. “I’m OK with the Association”, he told me eventually, “whenever the 
Chinese give some money [to the Association], we also get some, for school fees 
and things like that”.  
 
Others, on the other hand, insisted on calling themselves “Chinese”, or “Ex-Chinese”, 
and I was told several times that “Uyghur” and “Chinese” were the same thing. Here 
names played a very important role, and not only due to how the Kashgaris called 
themselves, but also about how they referred to their homeland: China, Xinjiang, or 
East Turkestan, and the ways they looked at their own history. Aziz, for instance, a 
Kashgari trader who owns a garment shop in the Beijing Shopping Center, in the 
China Market in Rawalpindi, told me his story in the following way: “We migrated to 
Pakistan in 1967 when I was 6 years old. […] During the British rule over the subcon-
tinent there was no border as such. I have heard from my parents that my grandfa-
ther and grand grandfather used to go to China for the purpose of trade. They got 
married there and settle there. In 1949 private property was nationalized in China, 
and this was probably one of the reasons for the migration to Pakistan. But we did 
not escape from China. […] China gave us permission to migrate to China [because 
our forefather had British passports]”. Aziz, during the course of the whole inter-
view, was very careful in choosing his words. He admitted that part of the reason 
his family left China was due to Mao’s new policies, but he never once criticized the 
Chinese government and repeatedly stressed that they did not “escape” from China. 
On the contrary, while talking about the current situation in Xinjiang, he told me 
that the Chinese government knew how to “provide justice for the masses” and 
“care for the poor population”. He was involved with the Association, and used to 
go to China several times each year. As some others, he rarely used the word “Xin-
jiang”, and never the expression “Turkestan”, rather referring to it as “China” and to 
himself as “Chinese”. 
 
Not all Kashgaris, moreover, want to get involved with the Association’s activities. 
Habib is one of them. I was introduced to him as his father, I was told, was Kashgari, 
which I thought would make him a Kashgari too. Yet as soon as we met, Habib told 
me very clearly: “No, I don’t feel like that”. Habib is young, in is mid-twenties, he 
has a degree from a university in Karachi and at times works as a travel guide. His 
English is excellent, and over the course of a few interviews he told me the story of 
his family. Since he was a kid, for some reasons, Habib never wanted to have any-
thing to do with his Uyghur background. Some of his brothers and sisters, for in-
stance, learned to speak some Uyghur language from their father, but he always 
refused to speak it. Now he knows about the Association. “When they have meet-
ings they invite me”, he told me once. “But I don’t know, I don’t want to go. I know 
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those people, they say that they help all the Kashgaris, but all they do is to keep the 
money for themselves. My family is different, we don’t join them. When my father 
came [from Xinjiang] he was very poor. At first he was a manual labourer, then he 
was employed by the government, though in a low position. […] I think we are the 
only Kashgari family whose children managed to study. The other families are rich, 
but they don’t put their kids into school, they just give them business to handle. We 
are different, my father married a Gilgiti, and we always stayed close to my moth-
er’s family. I don’t feel Kashgari at all, I think that many Kashgaris here in Gilgit don’t 
even know we are Kashgaris”.  
 
The “Overseas  Chinese”  framework 
China’s relation with its overseas communities has been an important subject of 
analysis for several decades (Fitzgerald 1972; Hodder 1996; Tan 2014). In 1978, the 
establishment of the “Overseas Chinese Affaire Office” (qiáobàn) under the State 
Council was seen, in particular, as an implicit claim that the Overseas Chinese be-
longed to China, thus legitimizing “the work aimed at enhancing the symbolic affilia-
tion and material contribution of the overseas Chinese to their homeland” (Bara-
bantseva 2005: 4). Within this scheme, particularly since the period of reform, a 
remarkable number of associations were created among diasporic communities, 
often by traders and businessmen with connections to the Mainland. In 2002, as 
related by Barabantseva (2005), a programme called “Developing Motherland and 
Benefiting-Assisting Overseas Chinese” was created by the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office. “This plan” she argues, “has a two-fold strategy. Firstly, it seeks to promote 
the interaction between old overseas Chinese communities, and new Chinese mi-
grants. The second component of the plan involves work on enhancing connections 
between overseas Chinese communities and China. This plan is one example of a 
series of strategies employed by the Chinese nation-state to attach the overseas 
Chinese to the modernisation project in China. Another side of these strategies is to 
export the PRC’s ideological presence in the Chinese communities abroad” (16). As 
part of the latter strategy, as Nyíri (1999) pointed out, the most recent Chinese 
overseas organizations have been either set up through the PRC’s direct involve-
ment, or are strongly oriented toward it. 
 
If the establishment of the Overseas Chinese Association in Pakistan might well fit 
within the aims of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office’s project, it also seems at the 
same time very distinct from them. Particularly, unlike the dynamic described by 
Barabantseva, in the case of the Uyghur community of Pakistan there is not any 
apparent economic interest by the Chinese government, and nothing to gain in 
terms of “modernization project in China”. Quite the contrary. Formally at least, the 
Association in Pakistan was formed with the specific purpose of “supporting” the 
local Kashgari community. In the course of my interviews I was also told that in 
some cases the Chinese authorities offered to a few families the possibility to return 
to Xinjiang as Chinese citizens. A Kashgari trader from Gilgit, in particularly, told me 
that he was offered a house in Kashgar, and various incentives to open a new busi-
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ness within the new Kashgar’s Special Economic Zone, with significant fiscal ad-
vantages. None of the Kashgaris I have met accepted those offers, claiming that 
they rather feel “at home” in Pakistan, where they are free to practice their religion. 
In this context, however, it is important to notice that the implementation of the 
Overseas Chinese Association in Pakistan does not seem to be based on the PRC’s 
economic interests, but rather on China’s objective to bring, somehow, this com-
munity closer to its economic and political principles.  
 
Uyghurs, moreover, are a minority in China, a condition that adds another layer of 
complexity. In fact, the PRC’s policy toward the Overseas Chinese is “tailored” to the 
Han (Barabantseva 2005: 29). Despite recent attempts by Chinese scholars to high-
light the multi-national nature of the Chinese communities abroad, claiming their 
identities remains a “taboo zone” for the Chinese government. Barabantseva thus 
argues that although “these groups are not completely absent from the vocabulary 
of the PRC’s officialdom”, China seems to silently accord to the fact that “it does not 
have enough legitimacy to seek the loyalty of the Chinese ethnic minorities over-
seas” (Barabantseva 2005: 31). And yet the case of the Overseas Chinese Associa-
tion in Pakistan seems to represent an exception. Although the language is not al-
ways clear, and members of the Association seem, at time, to be voluntarily ambig-
uous about it, the goal of the Association seems to be mostly political. Like with 
other - Han - overseas communities, in the case of the Uyghurs of Pakistan the Chi-
nese government seems to make a considerable effort in trying to win the loyalty of 
this community, aligning it to its nationalist agenda.  
 
In order to do so the Pakistani Overseas Chinese Association is not directly connect-
ed to Beijing and the central government, but rather to the Xinjiang government.17 
Here the main actor is the “Xinjiang Overseas Exchange Association” (Xīnjiāng 
hǎiwài jiāoliú xiéhuì), which was set up in 1992 in order to create a link between the 
“Overseas Chinese from Xinjiang” (Xīnjiāng huáqiáo huárén) living in countries 
like Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Australia , Canada, and so 
on18. Little known, recently, in 2013, the “Xinjiang Overseas Exchange Association” 
held its second General Conference, in Urumqi, while a few years before it briefly 
made the (Chinese) news for donating 200,000 RMB (about 32000 US Dollars) to the 
Pakistani community.19 As part of the Association’s attempt to draw the overseas 
                       
17 Xinjiang is formally an “autonomous region” (zìzhì qū) of the People’s Republic of China. Unlike the Soviet 
model from which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took inspiration for its minority policy, however, China’s 
autonomous regions remain under overarching control of the CCP, and do not have the right (even theoretical) 
to secede. Although, then, the local, Uyghur-lead government, maintains, on paper, vast power over the region, 
the ultimate authority is in the hands of the Xinjiang’s CCP Secretary - a Han Chinese. (Millward and Tursun 2004: 
87-98). 
18 “Xīnjiāng hǎiwài jiāoliú xiéhuì huànjiè jì dì èr jiè lǐshì dàhuì zhàokāi (Xinjiang Overseas Exchange Association 
convenes for re-election and Second General Conference), August 19, 2013, China News (Zhōngguó xīnwén 
wǎng)  (http://www.chinanews.com/zgqj/2013/08-19/5176811.shtml) 
19 “Xīnjiāng hǎiwài jiāoliú xiéhuì wèiwèn bājīsītǎn huárén huáqiáo (Xinjiang Overseas Chinese Association salutes 
Pakistan’s Overseas Chinese)”, July 17, 2008, Sina  
(http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2008-07-17/163214178431s.shtml); “Xīnjiāng hǎiwài jiāoliú xiéhuì xiàng bā huáqiáo 
huárén xiéhuì juānzèng 20 wàn yuán (Xinjiang Overseas Chinese Association donates 200000 yuan to Pakistan’s 
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Xinjiang groups closer to the homeland, I was told in Pakistan that yearly visits to 
Xinjiang were organized for various members of the community. In a case, in 2012, 
a small delegation was invited to Beijing as part of the “Delegation of Overseas Chi-
nese minorities from Xinjiang” (Xīnjiāng shǎoshù mínzú huárén huáqiáo kǎochá 
tuán). In a picture I was shown in a Kashgari shop in Gilgit, a group of about three 
dozen people gathered in one of Beijing’s largest “Xinjiang restaurant”, where they 
held a conference followed by a traditional Uyghur meal and dances. 
 
As I have already shown, however, the Association’s goal to organize the Kashgaris 
into a loyal, pro-Beijing community of Overseas Chinese has only partly succeeded. 
In fact, though generating a renewed sense of belonging to a distinct, diasporic 
community, it promoted the fragmentation of the community along political lines: 
those who view positively the CCP’s rule over Xinjiang and those who, echoing the 
discourse of various Uyghur groups abroad, challenge it more or less openly.  
                                                              







Asked about the history of their community, most Kashgaris would point to Sep-
tember 11, 2001, as the day when things began to change dramatically for them. 
Shortly after the attacks on the United States, China highlighted the presence of 
Uyghur terrorists in Pakistan, and in a few years, through the Overseas Chinese As-
sociation, it began - almost for the first time - to actively interact with the Kashgaris. 
Squeezed between an Islamist threat, the economic power of the PRC, their own 
loyalties to both Xinjiang and Pakistan, the Kashgaris appeared to me as a communi-
ty struggling to place itself in a world that, for them, had abruptly changed.   
 
Based on the data I collected during my fieldwork I find it reasonable to conclude 
that since the opening of the Karakoram Highway various factors such as the facility 
for the Kashgaris to travel to Xinjiang, the flow of Uyghur pilgrims to Pakistan, the 
September 11 attacks and Beijing’s war on terrorism, and the creation of the Over-
seas Chinese Association by the Chinese embassy in Islamabad, brought at least two 
major consequences: a re-definition (and for many, re-discovery) of a specific Kash-
gari identity, and a division of the community along political lines.  
 
Those two elements emerged quite distinctively in the course of my interviews, 
where often Kashgaris would refer to a recent “re-discovery” of their history, of 
their culture, of their distinctiveness. Some of them called this a new “awareness”, 
but on a general level I have found that the community was still struggling with 
what this implies. A young Kashgari synthesized it for me in the following way: 
“Now it feels like there are two separate communities [of Kashgaris], but I believe 
that in a few years it will be better. Before, the community was united, but without 
any awareness about our culture. Now – on the other hand - we know we are dif-
ferent from the Pakistani, we have this awareness”.  
 
Quite ironically then, it seems that a major cause for the division of the community 
along political lines was precisely the Association, which in the first place intended 
to “unite” the Kashgaris within the Overseas framework. In this sense, the route 
toward this new, “culturally aware”, unity for the Kashgari community, seems still 
long and rugged. If, on one hand, Umer’s criticism of the Association is harsh, on the 
other hand relevant members of the Association ostracize Umer and generally claim 
that he is working against the interests of the Kashgaris. To me, it seemed that the 
two groups were speaking two different, mutually unintelligible, languages. Most 
interestingly, they both recurred to established patterns and formulations rooted in 
the WUC (for Umer) and the CCP’s (for the Association) rhetoric. Curiously then, for 
instance, their accounts of recent visits to Xinjiang were completely different. If, for 
Umer, Uyghurs in Xinjiang were exploited, their basic rights denied, for people like 
Abdul Qayyum Xinjiang was a peaceful and developed country, where Chinese gov-
ernment’s policies were well accepted and implemented by the local population. In 




those competing, opposite views, particularly as politics seemed to be constantly 
mixed with personal rivalries, it seems clear how both groups are placing them-
selves within larger, established narratives.  
 
As I have already anticipated in the first part of the paper, my conclusion is the fol-
lowing: since the opening of the Karakoram Highway and the arrival in Pakistan of 
various, competing narratives defining the Kashgaris either as Uyghur, (ex-)Chinese, 
or Pakistani, the ethnonym “Kashgari” with its fragmented and undefined history 
became not only inapt to the new circumstances, but also a threat to the survival of 
the community itself. In other words, in order to endure as a community, the Kash-
garis had to re-shape their identity according to those newly arrived narratives, and 
thus, inevitably, ended up splitting along them in political terms. This ongoing pro-
cess, this struggle, is visible in the lives and the tales of those people, and in the 
constant re-formulation of those narratives, within which their very lives and histo-
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